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Abstract
his study developed a new ambiguity measure using the bid-ask spread. he results 
suggest that the degree of ambiguity has an impact on the daily UK stock market 
returns, but ambiguity does not cause changes in the returns. his implies that UK 
stock prices or returns cannot be predicted using variation in the degree of ambiguity 
through linear models, such as the VAR model, which was used in the study. he two 
sets of results in the study show that the degree of ambiguity from the previous two 
days might afect stock market returns. he authors observe that an increase in the 
degree of ambiguity two days ago is associated with a positive premium required by the 
investors. On the other hand, the degree of ambiguity tends to be afected by its past 
ive-day values. hus, the degree of ambiguity seems to persist for ive days until inves-
tors update their priors. he intuition behind the result is that the degree of ambiguity 
can afect the returns of the UK stock market and UK stock market returns can in turn 
have an impact on the degree of ambiguity. he authors also observe that the degree of 
ambiguity does not seem to predict stock market returns in the UK when one applies 
linear models. However, this does not mean that there is no non-linear relationship 
between the degree of ambiguity and stock market returns or stock returns.
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INTRODUCTION
Ambiguity, which is also known as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 
1921), refers to the uncertainty in probability distribution of asset 
prices due to misinterpretation or lack of information. Since Ellsberg’s 
experiment showed the invalidity of the independence axiom of the 
subjective expected utility (SEU) theory (Ellsberg, 1961), ambiguity 
has been a popular topic. Dow and Werlang (1992) and Garlappi et al. 
(2007) studied the efect of ambiguity on portfolio choice based on the 
multiple-prior model. 
he authors demonstrated that the multiple-prior model performs 
empirically better than the classic mean and variance approach and 
the Bayesian approach when the investors are ambiguity-averse. 
Routledge and Zin (2009) investigated the impact of ambiguity on li-
quidity and found that investors behave under multiple-prior prefer-
ences. Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) also studied the efect of ambiguity 
on liquidity and they proved that ambiguity can be associated with 
illiquid inancial markets, since market makers chose not to partici-
pate in the market when there is lack of information. Ambiguity is also 
believed to have contributed to the 2008 inancial crisis. he empiri-
cal study of Boyarchenko (2012) showed that an increase in ambiguity 
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could statistically explain the increase in the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which led to the 2008 
inancial crisis. herefore, both the theoretical and empirical studies seem to suggest that ambiguity is 
closely related to liquidity of the inancial markets. 
he concept of the degree of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is abstract, which can be measured us-
ing simulation, but hard to measure by applying real-life data. his inspires us to develop an empirical 
method using the bid-ask spread to measure the degree of ambiguity with reference to the economic 
theories in ambiguity.
Another motivation for us to conduct this study is that although ambiguity asset pricing theories are 
well-established and there are a relatively large number of existing theoretical literature on ambiguity 
asset pricing, the number of empirical studies remain few. his can be contributed to the diiculties in 
measuring the degree of ambiguity or ambiguity aversion empirically. Ambiguity utility models include 
the smooth model, which was developed by Klibanof et al. (2003), and the multiplier model, which was 
originally developed by engineers to do robust control (Hansen & Sargent, 2001; Anderson et al., 2003). 
he ambiguity utility models can be discrete or dynamic. However, dynamic models are even harder to 
be applied to real life. he multiple-prior model and the multiplier model are widely used because they 
are less controversial (Epstein & Schneider, 2010). 
Existing empirical studies are mostly based on the multiple-prior model, but since it does not require 
the calculation of entropy, which is hard to estimate empirically while necessary to estimate if the multi-
plier utility model is adopted. herefore, our empirical study is based on the discrete-time multiple-pri-
or utility model, which makes our empirical work easy to conduct and in the meantime does not require 
simulations and pre-set values. Viale et al. (2014) used the idea of the multiple-priors utility to construct 
a learning model under the presence of ambiguity and then investigated the efect of ambiguity on the 
pricing process of the US cross-section stocks. However, they introduced entropy to measure the dis-
tance between the reference prior and the worst-case prior and hence they had to pre-set the conidence 
level of decision-makers to calculate the entropy. Nevertheless, their results imply that ambiguity is 
priced and the pricing efect cannot be substituted by other risk or uncertainty factors. Other empiri-
cal studies mainly focus on portfolio choice problems. For instance, Dimmock et al. (2016) investigated 
market participation of households under ambiguity. hey found that investors under-diversiied their 
portfolios due to ambiguous information and the 2008 inancial crisis could be contributed to ambigu-
ity aversion.
In contrast to the above studies, we developed a new empirical approach to measure the degree of am-
biguity using the bid-ask spread. his idea is inspired from the theoretical literature (e.g., Routledge & 
Zin, 2009; Ozsoylev & Werner, 2011), which showed the efect of ambiguity on liquidity. 
On the other hand, we follow Epstein and Schneider (2010) to establish the relationship between degree 
of ambiguity and equity premium and to develop an empirical measure of the degree of ambiguity using 
the bid-ask spread. We eliminated the impact of market makers on the spread according to microstruc-
ture theories of inancial markets. We implemented the Grossman and Miller (1988) market making 
model to construct a spread measure of ambiguity that is orthogonalized to the impact of market mak-
ers and liquidity traders. Since there was little existing empirical literature on the relationship between 
ambiguity and stock returns, especially in the UK stock market, we used a VAR model, which enabled 
us to analyze the interactions between the degree of ambiguity and the UK stock market returns in a 
system.
We have found that an increase in the degree of ambiguity in the previous two days is associated with 
an increase in the daily UK stock market returns. Moreover, the degree of ambiguity seems to persist for 
ive days until investors update their prior. 
3Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2017
However, the results of the Granger causality test suggest that the degree of ambiguity may not be used 
as a signal to predict any patterns of the stock market returns in the UK. Since the VAR model is based 
on linearity, we can conclude is that an increase in ambiguity cannot predict price increase linearly. 
Hence, predictability could exist when non-linear models are applied. For instance, results of Viale et 
al. (2014) implied that variation of the degree of ambiguity could predict stock prices using the logistic 
smooth transition autoregressive (LSTAR) model, which is a non-linear model.
he main contributions of this paperto the ambiguity studies are three-fold. First, we provided a new 
empirical approach to measure ambiguity and this measure does not require pre-set values, meaning 
that all the data applied are real-life. Second, we investigated the efect of ambiguity on the UK stock 
market, which has not been well-studied. hird, we showed empirically that ambiguity has an impact 
on the UK stock market returns, but it does not cause the returns, which means that ambiguity might 
not be used to predict the UK stock market returns using linear models. On the other hand, we also 
provided motivations for future studies to use non-linear models to study the efect of ambiguity or 
ambiguity-aversion on asset pricing.
he remaining sections are organized as follows. In section 1, we briely introduce the theories related to 
the multiple-priors model that we used in our study. In section 2, we provide a description of the data. 
Section 3 describes the methods that we used to implement our research, followed by section 4, where 
the empirical results are presented. In addition to the discussion of the empirical results, we also include 
a discussion of the results from the robustness analysis in section 5. Finally, we did a short summary 
and conclusion in inal section.
1. ǧ

	


1.1. The Ellsbergs experiment
The ambiguity literature is inspired from the 
Ellsberg’s experiment (Ellsberg, 1961) and 
hence we begin the illustration of the multiple-
priors utility model with the Ellsberg’s experi-
ment. The basic idea is that there are two urns 
with uncertainty, one of which is known as an 
ambiguous urn and the other, a risky urn. In 
the ambiguous urn, which we denote as Urn 1, 
there are 100 red balls and black balls, which is 
the only piece of information that is known to 
a decision-maker. The risky urn, which we de-
note as Urn 2, is composed of 50 red balls and 
50 black balls and thus, the decision-maker has 
more information about the composition of the 
urn now. Then the decision-maker is asked to 
bet on the color that is drawn from either Urn 1 
or Urn 2. Therefore, he has four options, which 
are betting red from Urn 1, betting black from 
Urn 1, betting red from Urn 2 and betting black 
from Urn 2. Table 1 summarizes the options 
that the decision-maker can choose.
Table 1. ŽŶƟŶŐĞŶĐǇƚĂďůĞŽĨůůƐďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ
??? Red Black
Urn 1 Red from Urn 1 Black from Urn 1
Urn 2 Red from Urn 2 Black from Urn 2
On the other hand, Table 1 also tells us that there 
are four possible outcomes, which are drawing 
a red ball from Urn 1, drawing a black ball from 
Urn 1, drawing a red ball from Urn 2 and drawing 
a black ball from Urn 2. We can assign payofs to 
these outcomes to construct a table that summaris-
es the decisions, outcomes and corresponding pay-
ofs. he payofs are assigned in a way that if the 
decision-maker has a right guess, he will be award-
ed 100 and he will get nothing if his guess is wrong. 
Table 2 illustrates the decisions, outcomes and pay-
ofs regarding Urn 1 and Urn 2, respectively.
Now suppose that the decision-maker can ran-
domise his choice and hence he can toss a fair coin 
(50-50 percent chance for head and tail to show 
up) to decide which color to bet from Urn 1. 
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Now the ambiguous urn resembles the risky 
urn in the sense that the randomisation pro-
cess is equivalent to assigning a probability of 
0.5 for the red ball to turn up and a probability 
of 0.5 for the black ball to turn up. However, 
under the subjective expected utility (SEU) 
WKHRU\ D GHFLVLRQPDNHU VKRXOG EH LQGL൵HU-
HQW DPRQJ WZR LQGL൵HUHQWRSWLRQV DQGD UDQ-
domized combination of them, which is what 
the independence axiom tells. In mathemati-
cal terms, if for any two options ,  f f c  and 
f f c:  then
 
   
1
1 1 ,
f f f
f ' f f
D D D
D D D
    a  
   a    
c c
 (1)
where > @0, 1D   and  a  denotes that two op-
tions are indiferent.
We can rewrite equation 1 as
 1f f ' f ' f .D D    a a (2)
However, from the Ellsberg’s experiment, we 
know that
 1 ,f f ' f ' fD D    ! a (3)
where 0 5.D   in our illustration.
herefore, the result from the Ellsberg’s experi-
ment violates the independence axiom of the SEU 
model, which inspires the development of ambi-
guity studies.
1.2. Multiple-prior utility model
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) developed the mul-
tiple-prior model with a utility function: 
    ,
p C
U f min u f dp

 ³ (4)
where C  is a set of priors, f  stands for an act, u  
represents a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vMN) 
utility function (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944), which is also known as subjective expect-
ed utility (SEU) function, and p  is the prior 
probability.
he rationale behind the model is that a decision 
maker assigns a range of probabilities to a pos-
sible outcome and adopts the minimal probabil-
ity or the worst-case scenario, which relects that 
he/she is ambiguous-averse. hen the preference 
on a decision is ranked with respect to the utility 
of the worst-case scenario and the decision mak-
er maximizes his/her utility and allocates his/her 
wealth according to the ranking. hus, the deci-
sion process is made up of a minimization and a 
maximization procedure, and hence this model is 
also known as MaxMin expected utility.
The multiple-prior model is widely applied. 
Dow and Werlang (1992) and Garlappi et al. 
(2007) studied the effect of ambiguity on port-
folio choice based on the multiple-priors mod-
el. Routledge and Zin (2009) and Ozsoylev and 
Werner (2011) investigated the impact of am-
biguity on liquidity and found that investors 
behave under multiple-prior utility. Viale et al. 
(2014) did an empirical study on the learning 
process in asset pricing using the multiple-pri-
or model and showed that ambiguity measure 
was statistically significant in the learning pro-
cess of asset pricing. The multiple-prior mod-
el is frequently used partly, because evidence 
has been found that it performs better than the 
classic mean and variance approach and the 
Bayesian approach empirically when the inves-
Table 2. ĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĂŶĚƉĂǇŽīƐŽĨĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƵƌŶ ?hƌŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƌŝƐŬǇƵƌŶ ?hƌŶ ? ?
Urn 1 Red Black
Bet red 100 0
Bet black 0 100
Urn 2 Red Black
Bet red 100 0
Bet black 0 100
Notes: “red” and “black” in the irst row represent the outcomes of a red ball and a black ball, respectively; “bet red” and “bet 
black” in the irst column represent the decision-maker’s decisions (also known as acts in economic terms) of betting a red ball 
and betting a black ball, respectively.
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tors are ambiguity-averse (Garlappi et al., 2007). 
Therefore, we assume investors are ambiguity-
averse and adopt the multiple-prior model in 
our study.
2. DATA
To measure the impact of ambiguity on market 
returns, we collected the daily closing price, bid 
price, ask price and turnover by volume of the 
equity traded fund of FTSE100 from Datastream. 
ETF FTSE100 is traded in pound sterling on the 
London Stock Exchange, which is a good proxy for 
the market return of the UK stock market. 
he sample period starts from 22 June, 2009 and 
ends on 1August, 2017. As such, we collected a to-
tal of 2.049 observations, which composed a rela-
tively large sample.
3. 

he daily closing prices were used to obtain the 
daily log returns of ETF FTSE100, which were cal-
culated as:
1
,tt
t
P
r ln
P
 (5)
where tr  is the daily log return of ETF FTSE100 
at time t and tP  is the price of ETF FTSE100 at 
time .t
3.1. Ambiguity measure
We then used bid and ask price to get the bid-ask 
spread, which estimates the degree of ambiguity. he 
ambiguity measure was constructed with inspiration 
from the ambiguity theory, especially the multiple-
priors preference model (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989). 
Assume that the investors have a homogeneous refer-
ence model on the distribution of the stock market 
return and hence a homogeneous reference return, 
,*r  the buyers and sellers of the market portfolio 
have diferent “worst-case scenarios” and hence use 
diferent priors of the stock market return because of 
ambiguity. Buyers are worried about a price decrease 
since they take a long position and will incur a loss if 
the price goes down. As such, their worst case is that 
the price goes below the reference price when they 
enter the long position, which makes them require 
a compensation for that uncertainty due to lack of 
information. Hence, they will quote a bid price as 
low as possible to get compensation for ambiguity. 
In terms of return, they will require the reference 
return minus an ambiguity term to compensate the 
possible loss they might face when they enter the 
long position. Suppose the degree of ambiguity ex-
pressed by return is k , then the prior return of the 
buyers will be .*r k  Similarly, sellers fear price in-
crease because they are in a short position and will 
incur a loss if the price goes up. herefore, their worst 
case is that the price goes beyond the reference price 
when they enter the short position. Hence, they will 
quote an ask price as high as possible to compensate 
ambiguity due to lack of information.
In terms of return, they will require the reference 
return plus an ambiguity term, ,*r k  to get the 
compensation for bearing ambiguity. In summary, 
we have:
1
1
*
t
t
B
ln ln B ln P r .
P
k

    (6)
1
1
,*t
t
A
ln ln A ln P r
P
k

    (7)
where B  and A  are bid and ask price, respectively, 
1tP  is the stock market price at time 1.t 
If we subtract equation (6) from equation (7), we 
will get:
2 .ln A ln B k   (8)
Equation (8) provides us with a method of mea-
suring degree of ambiguity k  and hence we use 
the following equation as a proxy of degree of 
ambiguity.
2
ln A ln B
K .
 (9)
3.2. The role of market makers
Having calculated the bid-ask spread using equa-
tion (9), we take the role of market makers into 
account because market makers make proits 
through the bid-ask spread. Grossman and Miller 
(1988) developed a market making model, taking 
transaction costs into consideration, which we ad-
opted as the theoretical base in terms of the role of 
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market makers in our study. Suppose there are two 
liquidity traders in the market, L1 and L2. L1 sells 
m  units of stocks at time 1 and L2 buys m  units at 
time 2. If we denote the number of market makers 
as n and the stock price at time i  is ,iS  then the 
present value of the stock at time 0 will be:
2
0 2 ,
1 1
m n
S A c
n n
P V      (10)
where the stock price is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean P  and variance 2 , cV  is 
the transaction costs per unit of the stock; and A  
is the degree of risk aversion of the traders, namely 
both the liquidity traders and the market makers.
Equation (10) provides us with an insight of the 
mechanism of market making. Liquidity with the 
presence of transaction costs can therefore be cal-
culated as:
 22 .1 1
m c n
L
n A nV

    (11)
Equation (11) tells us that liquidity, or the role of 
the market makers in the inancial markets can be 
afected by trading volume m, number of market 
makers n, degree of risk aversion ,A  transaction 
costs c and volatility of the stock price 2 .V
he number of the market makers in the inancial 
markets and the degree of risk aversion are dii-
cult to measure empirically. On the other hand, 
volatility interacts with ambiguity in asset pricing 
processes, as is illustrated by Epstin and Schneider 
(2010). his makes us reluctant to remove the im-
pact of volatility on the stock prices, or the spread. 
As a result, we used turnover by volume to mea-
sure the impact of market makers on the spread. 
As such, we regressed the spread calculated using 
the right-hand side of equation (9) on turnover by 
volume to remove the part of variation in the bid-
ask spread caused by the impact of market makers 
and then we treated the residuals as a measure of 
the degree of ambiguity.
3.3. Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
model
To investigate the interactions between the UK 
stock market return and ambiguity, we applied 
the VAR model. Since so far there is little empir-
ical work showing the relationship between the 
UK stock market return and ambiguity, a good 
way of uncovering the interactions between 
them is to analyse them as a system. Therefore, 
we applied the VAR model, which can be ex-
pressed as:
0 1 1 ,t t p t p ty y yE E E H    }   (12)
where ty  is a vector of dependent variables 
and the number of dependent variables deter-
mines the number of equations; E  are a vector 
of coeicients of diferent equations; p  is the 
order of the lags included in the model, which 
is determined by information criteria; tH  is a 
vector of error terms.
In our case, we have two dependent variables, 
the daily log returns tr  and the ambiguity mea-
sure k  and hence we have two equations in the 
VAR analysis, which are the return equation:
1 2
1 2
t t t t p
t t t q t
r r r r
k k k H
  
  
  } 
  }   (13)
and the ambiguity measure equation:
1 2
1 2 ,
t t t t p
t t t q t
r r r
k k k
k
H
  
  
  } 
  } 
 (14)
where p  and q  are the number of lags includ-
ed in the VAR model, which we selected based 
on information criteria.
Table 3. ^ƵŵŵĂƌǇƐƚĂƟƐƟĐƐ
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Volume 12.24363 10.64744 2.439972 13.52941
Spread 0.0029146 0.0074142 11.83696 163.7834
Return 0.0006019 0.0196546 -0.2925296 5.121268
Notes: volume denotes turnover by volume; spread represents ,k  which is calculated by equation (9); and return is the daily log 
return of ETF FTSE100.
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3.4. Preliminary analysis
he summary statistics of the variables is present-
ed in Table 3. We can see from the table that spread 
is positively skewed and the leptokurtic, while the 
distribution of return seems close to a normal dis-
tribution, which has a skewness of zero and a kur-
tosis of 3. he histogram displayed in Figure 1 pro -
vides further evidence. Since spread and return 
are used as dependent variables, we need to make 
sure they are approximately normal. As such, we 
took natural logarithm of spread to transform it 
to an approximately normally distributed variable.
he transformed spread now has a skewness of 
1.29077 and a kurtosis of 7.549364 with mean – 
6.276782 and standard deviation 0.7277081 and 
the histogram is shown is Figure 2, where we can 
see that the variable is now approximately nor-
mally distributed.
We then used the natural logarithm of spread to do 
the analysis. he time series plots of the variables 
are presented in Figure 3. he plots suggest that 
the series seem stationary.
3.4.1. Preliminary analysis of ambiguity measure
As is mentioned before, bid-ask spread is found 
to be related to the impact of market makers. To 
remove this efect, we regressed the natural loga-
rithm of spread on turnover by volume (volume) 
and the residuals were the ambiguity measure 
Notes: spread represents ,k  which is calculated by equation (9); and return is the daily log return of ETF FTSE100.
Figure 1. ,ŝƐƚŽŐƌĂŵŽĨƐƉƌĞĂĚĂŶĚƌĞƚƵƌŶ
Ϭ
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ƚǇ
Ͳ͘ϭ Ͳ͘Ϭϱ Ϭ ͘Ϭϱ ͘ϭ
ZĞƚƵƌŶ
Figure 2. ,ŝƐƚŽŐƌĂŵŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĂůůŽŐĂƌŝƚŚŵŽĨƐƉƌĞĂĚ
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͘ϰ
͘ϲ
͘ϴ
ϭ
Ğ
ŶƐŝ
ƚǇ
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Notes: spread represents ,k  which is calculated by equation (9); and ln  is the natural logarithm of .k
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Figure 3. dŝŵĞƐĞƌŝĞƐƉůŽƚƐŽĨǀŽůƵŵĞ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůŽŐĂƌŝƚŚŵŽĨƐƉƌĞĂĚĂŶĚƌĞƚƵƌŶ
Notes: return is the daily log return of ETF FTSE100; volume denotes turnover by volume; ln  is the natural logarithm of .k  
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orthogonalized of the impact of market makers. 
hus, we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression using the following model.
0 1 ,t t tln k VolumeE E H    (15)
where k  is the ambiguity measure, which is cal-
culated by equation (9) and volume is turnover by 
volume. To ensure the validity of the regression 
result, we checked for heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation ater the regression. 
he Breusch-Pagan test showed a p-value of 0.0000, 
indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity at 1% 
signiicance level. On the other hand, the Breusch-
Grodfrey LM test generated a p-value of 0.0000 
for 20 lags, meaning that there is autocorrelation. 
herefore, we applied Newey-West standard er-
rors to run the regression. he regression result is 
shown in Table 4.
he regression result indicates that volume is not 
statistically signiicant at 10% signiicance level, 
meaning that the relationship between trading 
volume and the natural logarithm of the ambigu-
ity in equation (15) is not statistically signiicant. 
his is reasonable since ETF FTSE100 is a relatively 
liquid equity traded fund and the UK stock mar-
ket is an established stock market. As such, market 
makers may not contribute to the variation of the 
bid-ask spread signiicantly. We then used the am-
biguity measure calculated by equation (9) to run 
the VAR model.
3.4.2. VAR model specification
VAR model requires stationary dependent vari-
ables and hence we began the formal analysis with 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root. 
he test results are shown in Table 5.
he null hypothesis of the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test is non-stationarity and hence, a small 
p-value indicates stationarity of the series upon 
rejection of the null. hus, the test results show 
that both the natural logarithm of the ambigu-
ity measure and return of ETF FTSE100 seem 
stationary at 1% signiicance level. herefore, the 
two variables are ready for the VAR model with-
out modiication.
On the other hand, it is important to decide the lag 
number, or the lag order p of the model to imple-
ment the VAR analysis. We selected lag order by 
information criteria and the result is displayed in 
Table 6.
Table 4. ZĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƌĞƐƵůƚǁŝƚŚEĞǁĞǇ ?tĞƐƚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞƌƌŽƌƐ
Ln  spread Coefficient
New-West 
Std. Error t p-value
Volume 0.0038211 0.0027132 1.41 0.159
Constant 6.323566*** 0.0597324 105.86 0.000
Notes: Ln  spread denotes the natural logarithm of ,k  and volume denotes turnover by volume.
Table 5. ƵŐŵĞŶƚĞĚŝĐŬĞǇ ?&ƵůůĞƌƚĞƐƚƌĞƐƵůƚ
Variable Z p-value
Ln  ambiguity 4.397 0.0003
Return 9.546 0.0000
Notes: Ln  ambiguity denotes the natural logarithm of ,k  and return denotes the daily log return of ETF FTSE100.
Table 6. /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĨŽƌůĂŐƐĞůĞĐƟŽŶ
FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
Lag 13 13 5 5
Notes: FPE is the inal prediction error measure; AIC is the Akaike’s information criterion; HQIC is the Hannan and Quinn 
information criterion; and SBIC is the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion.
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he result in Table 6 shows that FPE and AIC cri-
terion yield diferent results from HQIC and SBIC 
criterion. Lütkepohl (2006) suggested using FPE 
and AIC for small sample. HQIC and SBIC seem 
to work better with large samples. However, if we 
choose a smaller number of lags, we are running 
the risk of neglecting efects of other lags. As such, 
we mainly used the VAR results with both 5 lags 
while treated the VAR results with 13 lags as a ro-
bustness check. herefore, the return equation of 
our VAR model is:
1 2 5
1 2 5 .
t t t t
t t t t
r r r r
ln k ln k ln k H
  
  
  } 
  }  (16)
and Ln  ambiguity equation is:
1 2 5
1 2 5 ,
t t t t
t t t t
ln k r r r
ln k ln k ln k H
  
  
  } 
  }  (17)
where tln k  is the natural logarithm of the ambi-
guity measure k  at time ,t  and tr  is the daily log 
return of ETF FTSE100 at time .t
he return equation of the robustness test is:
1 2 13
1 2 13 ,
t t t t
t t t t
r r r r
ln k ln k ln k H
  
  
  } 
  }  (18)
and the Ln  Ambiguity equation is:
1 2 13
1 2 13 ,
t t t t
t t t t
ln k r r r
ln k ln k ln k H
  
  
  } 
  }  (19)
where tln k  is the natural logarithm of the ambi-
guity measure k  at time ,t  and tr  is the daily log 
return of ETF FTSE100 at time .t
4. 
Table 7 presents the empirical result of the VAR 
model with 5 lags. From panel A, we can see that 
the fourth lag of the daily return of ETF FTSE100 
is statistically signiicant at 1% level and the sec-
ond lag of the ambiguity measure is statistically 
signiicant at 10% level in the return equation. he 
statistically signiicant coeicient of the second 
lag of the daily return suggests that a 1% increase 
in the daily return that happened four days ago 
would decrease the daily return today by around 
5.79% at 1% signiicance level. On the other hand, 
the coeicient of the fourth lag of the ambiguity 
measure suggests that an increase in the degree of 
ambiguity would increase the stock market return 
at 10% signiicance level. his also implies that 
when the degree of ambiguity increases, investors 
would require an ambiguity premium, which in 
turn increases the return. However, the Granger 
causality test indicates that Ln  ambiguity does 
not Granger-cause the variation in stock market 
return at 10% signiicance level. his can be fur-
ther implied from the orthogonalised impulse re-
sponse function in Figure 4, which shows that the 
response of the daily return of ETF FTSE100 to a 
1% change in the ambiguity measure is not statisti-
cally signiicant at 5% level.
he rejection of the causality relationship between 
the daily return and the ambiguity measure im-
plies that past values of the ambiguity measure 
cannot be used to predict the daily returns of the 
stock market. his suggests that ambiguity mea-
sure cannot be used to predict the stock market 
return linearly. However, this does not mean that 
the degree of ambiguity cannot predict the vola-
tility of stock returns. For instance, Epstein and 
Schneider (2010) showed that ambiguity aversion 
afects the premium of stocks generates excess 
variation of stock returns. herefore, even though 
the degree of ambiguity does not Granger-cause 
the daily return of the stock market, it seems to 
afect its premium, which is in line with our em-
pirical results.
Panel B illustrates the regression result of the 
Ln  ambiguity equation. he third lag of stock 
market return is statistically signiicant at 5% 
level and all the lags of Ln  ambiguity are 1% 
signiicant. his result indicates that an in-
crease in the daily return of the stock market 
tends to increase the degree of ambiguity of 
the investors, which in turn implies that inves-
tors tend to be confused, or ambiguous about 
the returns from the previous three days. 
On the other hand, past degree of ambiguity tends 
to persist and the degree of ambiguity can be ac-
cumulated at least for a period of ive days. he 
Granger causality test suggests that return does 
not cause the variation in Ln  ambiguity at 10% 
signiicance level. his is also consistently visual-
ized from Figure 4, where we can see that the re-
sponse of the ambiguity measure to a 1% change 
in the daily return of ETF FTSE100 is not statisti-
cally signiicant at 5% level. However, it is notice-
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Table 7. sZƌĞƐƵůƚǁŝƚŚ ?ůĂŐƐ
Panel A. Return equation
Lag Coefficient p-value
Return
1 0.0130999 0.554
2 0.0198759 0.368
3 0.0004016 0.986
4 0.0579445*** 0.009
5 0.0321777 0.146
Ln  ambiguity
1 0.0003357 0.622
2 0.0013214* 0.056
3 0.0001828 0.794
4 0.0008111 0.240
5 0.000331 0.627
Constant 0.0027442 0.612
Granger causality Ln  ambiguity 5.079 0.406
Test statistics All 5.079 0.406
Panel B. Ln  ambiguity equation
Return
1 0.5262383 0.461
2 0.757903 0.288
3 1.4705** 0.039
4 1.131771 0.113
5 0.598707 0.402
Ln  ambiguity
1 0.2005302*** 0.000
2 0.1832782*** 0.000
3 0.0854842*** 0.000
4 0.1087189*** 0.000
5 0.1251023*** 0.000
Constant 1.863846*** 0.000
Granger causality Return 8.9776 0.110
Test statistics All 8.9776 0.110
Notes: Ln  ambiguity denotes the natural logarithm of k ; and return denotes the daily log return of ETF FTSE100.*** denotes 
1% signiicance level; ** denotes 5% signiicance level; and * denotes 1% signiicance level.
Figure 4. KƌƚŚŽŐŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƵŶĐƟŽŶ ?sZǁŝƚŚ ?ůĂŐƐ ?
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Note: Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
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Table 8. sZƌĞƐƵůƚǁŝƚŚ ? ?ůĂŐƐ
Panel A. Return equation
Lag Coefficient p-value
Return
1 0.018454 0.405
2 0.0250737 0.258
3 0.0000186 0.999
4 0.0619793*** 0.005
5 0.0345302 0.120
6 0.0131282 0.554
7 0.0217691 0.327
8 0.0342149 0.123
9 0.0116832 0.599
10 0.0037045 0.867
11 0.0039689 0.858
12 0.0337713 0.128
13 0.0005051 0.982
Ln  ambiguity
1 0.0001079 0.877
2 0.0014429** 0.041
3 0.0002669 0.708
4 0.0009175 0.197
5 0.0004071 0.568
6 0.0000153 0.983
7 0.0000513 0.943
8 0.0007193 0.314
9 0.0009008 0.206
10 0.0000149 0.983
11 0.0000924 0.896
12 0.0006202 0.376
13 0.0002672 0.699
Constant 0.0047421 0.443
Granger causality Ln  ambiguity 9.2101 0.757
Test statistics All 9.2101 0.757
Panel B. Ln  ambiguity Equation
Return
1 0.7627861 0.280
2 0.8046075 0.254
3 1.24295* 0.078
4 1.394665** 0.048
5 0.3005252 0.671
6 0.5933196 0.401
7 0.493998 0.484
8 1.376015* 0.051
9 1.289266* 0.068
10 0.5125471 0.468
11 2.454877*** 0.001
12 -0.6148589 0.384
13 1.198089* 0.090
Ln  ambiguity
1 0.1691672*** 0.000
2 0.1541337*** 0.000
3 0.0586237*** 0.010
4 0.075024*** 0.001
5 0.0856396*** 0.000
6 0.0399135* 0.080
7 0.0281818 0.216
8 0.0234796 0.302
9 0.003994 0.860
10 0.0353478 0.118
11 0.0475343** 0.035
12 0.0334648 0.133
13 0.0609314*** 0.006
Constant 1.205821*** 0.000
Granger causality Return 32.769*** 0.002
Test statistics All 32.769*** 0.002
Notes: Ln  ambiguity denotes the natural logarithm of ,k  and return denotes the daily log return of ETF FTSE100. *** denotes 
1% signiicance level; ** denotes 5% signiicance level; and * denotes 1% signiicance level.
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able that in Panel B, the p-value of the Granger 
causality test is 0.110, which is close to the 10% 
signiicance level. his implies that past daily re-
turns of the stock market might predict the degree 
of ambiguity to a very weak degree.
Overall, the VAR result with 5 lags seems to sug-
gest that the efect of ambiguity on stock market 
return exists but there is no/weak Granger causali-
ty relationship between the daily return of the ETF 
FTSE100 and the ambiguity measure.
5. 
The VAR results with 13 lags in Table 8 repre-
sent robustness checks to our empirical results. 
In the return equation, the second lag is again 
statistically significant but at 5% level instead 
of 10% level this time, as is shown in panel A. 
The result of Granger causality test still sug-
gests that Ln  ambiguity does not Granger 
cause stock market return, which is consistently 
shown in the orthogonalized impulse-response 
function in Figure 5.
In the Ln  ambiguity equation, the third, eighth, 
ninth and thirteenth lags are statistically sig-
niicant at 10% level, as is shown in Panel B. he 
fourth lag is statistically signiicant at 5% level and 
the eleventh lag is statistically signiicant at 1% 
level. he Granger causality test indicates that the 
stock market return causes Ln  ambiguity at 1% 
signiicance level.
We notice that the degree of ambiguity inluenc-
es the daily return of the UK stock market when 
wecompare the results of VAR with 5 lags and 
VAR with 13 lags. Moreover, the result of the VAR 
model with 13 lags suggests that changes in stock 
market return can Granger-cause variation in the 
ambiguity measure. Such Granger causality is sta-
tistically weak in the 5 lags case. When return de-
creases and hence price goes down, the degree of 
ambiguity will increase, and when price goes up, 
the degree of ambiguity tends to decrease. his 
seems to resemble the prospect theory in behav-
ioural inance, which says that investors are loss-
adverse, except that here we assume investors are 
ambiguity-averse.
In addition, the VAR result with 13 lags consis-
tently indicates that past values of the ambiguity 
measure seem to persist and the degree of ambigu-
ity can be accumulated for a period of ive days at 
1% signiicance level.
Figure 5. KƌƚŚŽŐŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƵŶĐƟŽŶ ?sZǁŝƚŚ ? ?ůĂŐƐ ?
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
Overall, the two sets of results show that the degree of ambiguity from the previous two days might af-
fect stock market returns. An increase in the degree of ambiguity two days ago is associated with a posi-
tive premium required by the investors. On the other hand, the degree of ambiguity tends to be afected 
by its past ive-day values. hus, the degree of ambiguity seems to persist for ive days until investors up-
date their prior. his result is robust when 13 lags are added to the VAR model. he intuition behind the 
result is that the degree of ambiguity can afect the returns of the UK stock market and UK stock market 
returns can in turn have an impact on the degree of ambiguity. We observe that the degree of ambigu-
ity does not seem to predict stock market returns in the UK when we apply linear models. However, 
this does not mean that there is no non-linear relationship between the degree of ambiguity and stock 
market returns or stock returns. Viale et al. (2014) discovered a non-linear relationship between stock 
returns and the ambiguity measure. herefore, further studies can investigate the interactions between 
the ambiguity measure that we developed in our study and stock returns using non-linear models.
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